Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)

Citation: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Parent Document: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2022-03-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278647/dorfman-v-smith/ ↗

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not, bring abuse of process action). The plaintiff could
          have, but did not, advance a claim for vexatious litiga-
          tion.12
             The plaintiff further argues that her claim is similar
          to a claim of vexatious litigation because protection of
          allegedly dishonest conduct does not further the public
          policy of candor in judicial proceedings but, rather,
          violates the state’s public policy against untrue allega-
          tions or denials in the course of litigation, as evidenced
          by § 52-99 and case law granting courts the inherent
          power to sanction parties for litigation misconduct. It
          is not clear whether the plaintiff is arguing that § 52-
          99 and our existing case law abrogate the litigation
          privilege in relation to knowingly false communications
          or that § 52-99 and our existing case law manifest a public
          policy against immunity under these circumstances.
             To the extent the plaintiff is attempting to argue that
          § 52-99 abrogates the common-law absolute immunity
          afforded for knowingly false communications made dur-
          ing and relevant to judicial proceedings, we disagree.
          Section 52-99 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any allegation
          or denial made without reasonable cause and found
          untrue shall subject the party pleading the same to the
          payment of such reasonable expenses, to be taxed by
          the court, as may have been necessarily incurred by
          the other party by reason of such untrue pleading . . . .’’
              12
                 By arguing that her claim is equivalent to a claim of vexatious litigation,
          the plaintiff appears also to be arguing that she did in fact sufficiently allege
          a vexatious litigation claim and that this court should not be bound by how
          she labeled the counts in her complaint. We are not persuaded. Although
          it is true that, for purposes of a motion to strike, our trial courts consistently
          have relied on the factual allegations of a count, and not the label placed
          on the count, in determining whether a claim has been sufficiently alleged;
          see, e.g., Penney v. Holley, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2015 WL 1587981,
          *2 (Conn. Super. March 13, 2015); the plaintiff’s complaint cannot reasonably
          be interpreted as raising a vexatious litigation claim, especially as, during
          argument on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff never argued that she was
          raising a vexatious litigation claim but, rather, argued only that the claims
          were similar to a vexatious litigation claim.
March 29, 2022           CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 73

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