Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)

Citation: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Parent Document: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2022-03-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278647/dorfman-v-smith/ ↗

Full Text

3,181 chars

underlying purpose; (2) whether the alleged conduct is
similar in essential respects to defamatory statements,
inasmuch as the privilege bars a defamation action; and
(3) whether the alleged conduct may be adequately
addressed by other available remedies. Id., 545. Assisting
in our evaluation of these factors, to the extent applica-
ble, we have considered as persuasive whether federal
courts have protected the alleged conduct pursuant to
the litigation privilege. See id., 545–46. These factors
and considerations, however, are ‘‘simply instructive,’’ and
courts must focus on ‘‘the issues relevant to the compet-
ing interests in each case’’ in light of the ‘‘particular
context’’ of the case.4 (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn.
630–31. We are not required to rely exclusively or
entirely on these factors, but, instead, they are useful
when undertaking a careful balancing of all competing
public policies implicated by the specific claim at issue
and determining whether affording parties this com-
4
For example, in MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. 630–31,
this court held that absolute immunity did not bar a claim of employer
retaliation. In MacDermid, Inc., the plaintiff employer filed an underlying
action for civil theft, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion, premised
on the defendant employee’s conduct in relation to the employee’s workers’
compensation claim. See id., 622. The defendant employee then filed a
counterclaim, alleging that the plaintiff employer violated General Statutes
§ 31-290a by initiating the underlying action solely in retaliation for his
exercise of his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes
§ 31-275 et seq. Id. The plaintiff subsequently moved to dismiss the defen-
dant’s counterclaim, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over that claim because the doctrine of absolute immunity protects the act
of filing an action. Id. In holding that the litigation privilege did not apply
to a claim alleging a violation of § 31-290a, we noted that the claim did not
include the same stringent requirements and balancing of interests as does
a claim of vexatious litigation. Id., 632–33. Nevertheless, we determined
that the public policy underlying § 31-290a was similar to the public policy
underlying a claim of vexatious litigation. See id., 631, 635; see also part II
A of this opinion. Additionally, we relied heavily on the fact that, not only
would barring immunity not open the floodgates to retaliatory claims against
employers, but providing immunity actually would deter employees from
exercising their rights under the act. See id., 625 n.7, 635–36.
Page 58 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL March 29, 2022

Other Sections in This Document (164)

Full Text