Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)

Citation: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Parent Document: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2022-03-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278647/dorfman-v-smith/ ↗

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injuries were met at the time this action was initiated,
the defendant knew at that time that it was obligated
to pay the plaintiff, and it nevertheless refused to pay
the claim but, instead, ‘‘compelled [the plaintiff] to
resort to litigation to obtain what was due to her’’ under
the insurance policy.8 As I noted previously in this opin-
8
The majority states that, ‘‘[a]s the master of her complaint, the plaintiff
never argued to the trial court—and has not argued before this court—that
she premised any of her claims on conduct that occurred outside the course
of a judicial proceeding.’’ Footnote 6 of the majority opinion. I agree that the
plaintiff has not framed her argument in terms of prelitigation/postlitigation
conduct. But this court is addressing an important legal issue, and we are
not bound by the precise rubric and line drawing employed by the parties
in arguing their respective positions. See, e.g., Meribear Productions, Inc.
v. Frank, 340 Conn. 711, 732, 265 A.3d 870 (2021) (‘‘it is well established
that [w]e may . . . review legal arguments that differ from those raised by
the parties if they are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related
to the legal claim before the court’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This is especially true when, as here, the scope of a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction is being adjudicated. Cf. Fort Bend County v. Davis, U.S.
, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, 204 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2019) (‘‘Characterizing a rule
as a limit on [subject matter] jurisdiction renders it unique in our adversarial
system. . . . Unlike most arguments, challenges to [subject matter] jurisdic-
tion may be raised by the defendant at any point in the litigation, and courts
must consider them sua sponte.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)). Indeed, if, in light of the novelty and complexity of the issues
presented, the briefing of both parties in this appeal leaves something to
be desired and provides insufficient guidance for the proper adjudication
of those issues, it is fair to say that the majority itself has not relied exclu-
sively on arguments that are found in the defendant’s brief. In my estimation,
this is a good thing, because, otherwise, its opinion would fail to serve its
public function.
To the extent that the majority is making a different point—by suggesting
that, ‘‘[a]s the master of her complaint,’’ the plaintiff has failed to allege
prelitigation misconduct as a basis for her claim—I simply disagree, particu-
larly when reading the complaint liberally, as we must. The plaintiff’s com-
plaint alleged, among other things, that, prior to the commencement of
litigation, the defendant knew that the plaintiff (1) was not at fault in the
underlying automobile accident, (2) had complied with all of her duties as
a covered person under the insurance policy issued by the defendant, and
(3) was legally entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits from the
defendant under the policy. The complaint then expressly alleged that, by
engaging in the conduct alleged therein, the defendant violated its duty of
good faith and fair dealing by ‘‘compel[ing] [the plaintiff] to resort to litiga-
tion to obtain what was due to her from [the defendant] under the . . .
March 29, 2022 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 95

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