Skip to main content
DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Section 232-a

Citation
Section 232-a
Parent Document
Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 974 A.2d 626 (2009)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2009-07-14

Other Sections in This Document (118)

Full Text

1,704 chars
The Appellate Court first concluded that the tenant was "a tenant at will" in January, 1986, because the judgment in her *632 favor on the merits in the first summary process action "had `revived' the original lease arrangement," thus obligating her to pay rent to the landlord.[12] Id., at 155, 535 A.2d 377. The court further concluded that the lease also had survived the landlord's withdrawal of the second summary process action on January 29, 1986, because "[t]he right of [the landlord] to withdraw his action before a hearing on the merits, as allowed by [General Statutes] § 52-80,[13] is absolute and unconditional. Under our law, the effect of a withdrawal, so far as the pendency of the action is concerned, is strictly analogous to that presented after the rendition of a final judgment or the erasure of a case from the docket.... The withdrawal of the summary process action on January 29, 1986, effectively erased the court slate clean as though the eviction predicated on the November 15, 1985 notice to quit possession had never been commenced. The [landlord] and the [tenant] were back to square one, and the continuation of their lease ... was restored." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 157, 535 A.2d 377; see also Sproviero v. J.M. Scott Associates, Inc., 108 Conn.App. 454, 464-65, 948 A.2d 379 (concluding that revival of lease obligations at "square one" under Hird operates prospectively only and does not require "retroactive revival" of tenant's obligations under lease "because the landlord is compensated for assuming a tenant's obligations through use and occupancy payments"), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 906, 957 A.2d 873 (2008).