Section 232-a

Citation: Section 232-a
Parent Document: Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 974 A.2d 626 (2009)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2009-07-14
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1539908/waterbury-twin-llc-v-renal-trea... ↗

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Finally, I address Housing Authority v. Hird, supra, 13 Conn. App. 150, on which the defendants in the present action rely. In Hird, a residential landlord *481served an initial notice to quit on its tenant on July 15, 1985, alleging that the tenant “had violated the lease by maintaining the premises in an unsanitary condition and by keeping pets on the premises.” Id., 153. The notice contained the following language: “All payments made by you, on or after the date of this notice, shall be accepted as [u]se and [o]ccupancy [o]nly without prejudice to the [landlord’s] right to evict you.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The landlord then initiated a summary process action against the tenant, which ultimately resulted in a judgment for the tenant on November 6,1985. Id. Thereafter, the landlord served a second notice to quit on the tenant on November 15, 1985, alleging that the tenant had failed to pay that month’s rent. The landlord then initiated a second summary process action against the tenant, which the tenant sought to dismiss, claiming that the landlord had failed to comply with the federal regulations applicable to the apartment where the tenant resided. Id. In response to the tenant’s motion to dismiss, the landlord voluntarily withdrew the second summary process action on January 29, 1986. Id. On January 31,1986, the tenant was served with a third notice to quit possession, alleging nonpayment of rent for the month of January, 1986. Id., 154. In defense, the tenant asserted that no lease was in effect in January, 1986, because the second notice to quit had terminated the parties’ lease in November, 1985, and therefore, she could not be evicted for nonpayment of rent for that month since only use and occupancy payments were due. Id. The trial court rejected the tenant’s claim, determining that the tenant “was then occupying her apartment ... as a tenant at will” in January, 1986. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The tenant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly concluded that a rental agreement existed between the parties in January, 1986, because the first summary process action that resulted in a judg*482ment for the tenant and the second notice to quit operated to terminate the tenant’s lease. Id., 154-55.

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