Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 974 A.2d 626 (2009)

Citation: Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 974 A.2d 626 (2009)
Parent Document: Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 974 A.2d 626 (2009)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2009-07-14
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1539908/waterbury-twin-llc-v-renal-trea... ↗

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The plaintiffs claim that not requiring the service of a new notice to quit promotes judicial economy in summary process proceedings, particularly when the first notice to quit was valid. Indeed, they note that they promptly informed the defendants that the notice to quit was not being withdrawn, and that the action would be refilled, as the plaintiffs had no desire to revive the lease. Thus, the plaintiffs argue that they have performed the requisite “unequivocal act which clearly demonstrates [the landlord’s] intent to terminate the lease”;17 Sandrew v. Pequot Drug, Inc., 4 Conn. App. 627, 631, 495 A.2d 1127 (1985); and that it would frustrate judicial economy to require service of a new notice to quit prior to the commencement of a subsequent summary process action. Assuming that the underlying *473notice to quit was valid;18 see footnote 8 of this opinion; we acknowledge that the plaintiffs’ argument has some appeal on the discrete facts of this particular case, which involve a very short time line between actions and commercial parties represented by counsel. Guided, however, by the principles behind the New York case law, we agree with the defendants’ contention that not requiring the service of a new notice to quit as a per se rule could well complicate the status of the parties’ relationship after the withdrawal of the initial complaint, and would require more extensive determinations by the trial court concerning the parties’ intentions and whether postwithdrawal payments are for rent, or use and occupancy. Moreover, notwithstanding the dissent’s arguments to the contrary, the per se rule advocated by the defendants is not likely to be particularly costly or otherwise inefficient, as landlords can either amend the defects in their complaints, or simply serve a new notice to quit after withdrawal and prior to refiling, a process that could add only three days of delay prior to the institution of the subsequent summary process action. See General Statutes §§ 47a-23 (a) and *47447a-23a (a). Accordingly, we conclude that, after withdrawing its initial summary process action, the plaintiffs, as landlords, were required to serve a new notice to quit prior to commencing a new summary process action.19 Because they failed to do so, the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed this summary process action.20 The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and ZARELLA, J., concurred.

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