Section 232-a

Citation: Section 232-a
Parent Document: Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 974 A.2d 626 (2009)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2009-07-14
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1539908/waterbury-twin-llc-v-renal-trea... ↗

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The majority relies on Bargain Mart, Inc. v. Lipkis, 212 Conn. 120, 134, 561 A.2d 1365 (1989), in support of its position that we can not presume that the notice to quit in the present case was valid in the absence of a judicial determination of its validity. I find Bargain Mart, Inc., to be inapposite. In that case, the landlord had served notices to quit on the tenant and then had instituted a summary process action. Id., 122. The tenant had challenged the summary process action, asserting several special defenses including that the notices to quit served on him were invalid. Id., 122-23. The parties *479eventually settled that summary process action by a stipulated judgment, which did not specifically address the validity of the notice to quit. Id., 123. In a subsequent related action, the landlord attempted to assert that the notices to quit served on the tenant in relation to the prior action terminated the lease. Id., 125. Recognizing that the summary process action had been settled by a stipulated judgment and that “[s]uch a judgment represents ‘a settlement of the controversy by the parties thereto [thus creating the presumption] that the parties intended to settle all aspects of the controversy, including all issues raised by the papers comprising the record,’ ” this court concluded that it had “no basis for concluding that [the initial notices to quit] terminated the [tenant’s] lease.” Id., 135. This court’s conclusion in Bargain Mart, Inc., was clearly based on its conclusion as to which issues were resolved in the stipulated judgment and was designed to give effect to that stipulated judgment. Nothing in Bargain Mart, Inc., prohibits this court from assuming that the notice to quit served in the present case was valid for purposes of deciding whether the plaintiffs were required to serve another notice to quit on the defendants prior to bringing a second summary process action.

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