Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 (1995)

Citation: Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 (1995)
Parent Document: Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 (1995)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 1995-10-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7896280/gore-v-peoples-savings-bank/ ↗

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We disagree, however, with the Appellate Court’s further conclusion that the legislature intended not to permit excuses or justifications for such a per se violation. More specifically, we disagree that a landlord’s lack of notice is not related to a cause of action based on § 47a-8. Moreover, we believe that the Appellate Court misconstrued the relationship between common law premises liability and the doctrine of negligence per se in resolving the question of the availability of excuses in this case. The Appellate Court, after first concluding that the defendants’ violation of § 47a-8 constituted negligence per se for the purposes of the plaintiffs’ action, determined that it provided for strict liability because the statutory provision was “lacking any provision for an excuse for the violation . . . .” Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, supra, 35 Conn. App. 136. This analysis presumes that, if a statute is construed as providing for negligence per se, then that statute should be further construed as providing for no excuses unless the statute itself expressly provides for such excuses. The Appellate Court cited no authority for such a presumption in this context. A court’s interpretation that a statute provides for negligence per se ordinarily does not lead to the further conclusion that the statute prohibits excuses. See 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A, comment (d). Indeed, “[n]o statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import [and a statute] is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express.” (Internal quotation *383marks omitted.) Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 205 Conn. 166, 172, 530 A.2d 596 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 204 Conn. 472, 479, 528 A.2d 373 (1987); Dennis v. Shaw, 137 Conn. 450, 452, 78 A.2d 691 (1951); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1986 Rev.) § 50.05. Thus, the Appellate Court should have reasoned that notice was relevant to the plaintiffs’ action unless the legislature had expressly removed notice considerations from the action.

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