Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 (1995)

Citation: Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 (1995)
Parent Document: Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 (1995)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 1995-10-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7896280/gore-v-peoples-savings-bank/ ↗

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Before applying these principles to the present situation, we first acknowledge that this court has not often construed a statutory provision in the landlord-tenant context as creating a standard the violation of which constitutes negligence per se. The majority of cases concluding that a statutory provision implicates the doctrine of negligence per se have arisen in the context of motor vehicle regulation. See, e.g., Velardi v. Selwitz, 165 Conn. 635, 639, 345 A.2d 527 (1974); Busko v. DeFilippo, 162 Conn. 462, 466, 294 A.2d 510 (1972); Bailey v. Bruneau’s Truck Service, Inc., 149 Conn. 46, 54, 175 A.2d 372 (1961). Such a history, however, should not be read to suggest that the negligence per se doctrine is relevant only in the context of statutes pertaining to motor vehicles. Indeed, in Panaroni v. Johnson, supra, 158 Conn. 100-102, we concluded that the trial court had not improperly charged the jury that certain provisions of the New Haven housing code imposed an affirmative duty on the landlord, beyond the requirements of the common law, the violation of which gave rise to civil liability. Although the defective part of the premises at issue in the case was an outside stairway leading to the tenant’s apartment, this court approved a charge that had authorized the jury to consider whether the landlord had breached a common law duty to repair an area under his dominion and control or, in the event that the jury concluded that the stairway had not been under the landlord’s control, whether the landlord had breached a duty created under the provisions of the housing code.17

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