Azar v. Quinn, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 519 (1994)

Citation: Azar v. Quinn, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 519 (1994)
Parent Document: Azar v. Quinn, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 519 (1994)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 1994-01-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8351304/azar-v-quinn/ ↗

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Both Cohen and Camiel knowingly violated M.G.L.c. 93A by representing to the plaintiffs as true that which they knew to be false, specifically, by representing that Pleasures had the legal capacity to grant a sublease for a term of years when in fact it did not because it was only a tenant at will. Computer Sys. Eng’g. Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 571 F.Supp. 1365, 1375 (D.Mass. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1984) (in order to prove a knowing violation by fraud, the plaintiff may show that the agents of the defendant knew “that the fact that they represented to be true was not true”). Furthermore, and as previously noted, supra, the fact that Pleasures was in the process of being sold to Quinn was never communicated to the plaintiffs who believed they would sublet from and deal with Cohen and Camiel. This Court finds that Cohen’s and Camiel’s knowing violation of M.G.L.c. 93A renders them each individually liable to the plaintiffs for multiple damages in the amount of two times the compensatory damages of $1,745.88, or $3,491.76.

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