Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)

Citation: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Parent Document: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 1991-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2013415/haddad-v-gonzalez/ ↗

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If this standard sounds familiar, that is because it echoes the showing of a "willful or knowing" violation upon which c. 93A conditions the multiplication of damages. The statute provides, in relevant part, that damages for a successful petitioner "shall be ... up to three but not less than two times [actual or nominal damages] if the court finds that the use or employment of the act or practice [complained of] was a willful or knowing violation of [c. 93A, § 2]...." G.L.c. 93A, § 9 (3). The wilful conduct in this case is what makes the plaintiff's emotional distress compensable. If c. 93A is applied mechanically, therefore, once a plaintiff establishes that she is entitled to actual damages in this context, then ordinarily she also will have established  without more  that she is entitled to double or treble damages under the statute. As the court reads it, c. 93A will convert virtually every consumer's recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress into a recovery of multiple damages. *875 This result disregards legislative intent, and frustrates the structure of the statute. Nevertheless, the court concludes that it is compelled by the plain language of c. 93A. I disagree.

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