Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)

Citation: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Parent Document: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 1991-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2013415/haddad-v-gonzalez/ ↗

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Haddad further argues that principles of statutory^-construction require the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to authorize recovery for emotional distress under c. 93A. Haddad starts with the established rule that legislative intent must be considered in relation to the main object that the statute was intended to accomplish. See, e.g., Han-lon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). Haddad then identifies the objectives of § 9 by reference to cases and commentary discussing the preamendment version of the section. See Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass. 621 (1978); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688 (1975); Rice, New Private Remedies for Consumers: The Amendment of Chapter 93A, 54 Mass. L. Q. 307 (1969). We are not concerned here with that version of § 9, however, so these authorities do not aid Haddad at all. Moreover, as has been noted above, the more recent cases (as well as commentaries) construing the amended version of § 9 view the 1979 amendment as at least partly a response to the harsh result of Baldassari (see Leardi v. Brown, supra at 158, and commentaries cited), and as generally expanding the scope and remedial effect of § 9. See Maillet v. ATF-Davidson, Co., supra at 190-192. We perceive no necessary clash between recovery for emotional distress under c. 93A, and the apparent objectives of the statute in its present form.

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