Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)

Citation: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Parent Document: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 1991-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2013415/haddad-v-gonzalez/ ↗

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Beyond this reading of § 9 (3), Haddad's -construction, of § 9 (3) is at odds with the development of § 9 as a whole. Before the 1979 amendment, a loss of money or property was required before an action could be maintained? AT that time, therefore, actual damages necessarily "could consist only of pecuniary losses. The requirement of a loss of money or property was eliminated by the 1979 amendment, however, and § 9 (3) must be read in light of that change. Thus, in Maillet v. ATF-Davidson Co., supra, we held that damages due to personal injuries are recoverable under c. 93A. To construe § 9 (3) as Haddad does is effectively to reinstate the requirement of a pecuniary loss that the Legislature deleted in 1979.

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