Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)

Citation: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Parent Document: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 1991-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2013415/haddad-v-gonzalez/ ↗

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Haddad next characterizes Gonzalez’s damages as merely “subjective,” and argues that such damages are so problepi-atic that the Legislature could not have intended to allow recovery for them under c. 93A when it amended the statute. This argument is unpersuasive. We see no reason to read § 9 as excluding recovery for damages that are fully proved, even so-called “subjective” damages. We agree with the view of courts of other jurisdictions that have considered similar arguments in analogous circumstances and have held that such damages are recoverable as actual damages. See Pope v. Rollins Protective Serv. Co., 703 F.2d 197, 204-205 (5th Cir. 1983); Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710, 715-716 (W. Va. 1988). Compare Millstone v. O’Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 834-835 (8th Cir. 1976); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 932 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Phillips, supra at 976; Creditors Protective Assoc., Inc. v. Britt, 58 Or. App. 230, 233-234 (1982); Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., supra at 527-528; Chomicki v. Wittekind, 128 Wis. 2d 188, 200-202 (1985).

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