Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)

Citation: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Parent Document: Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658 (1991)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 1991-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2013415/haddad-v-gonzalez/ ↗

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“The general and familiar rule is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.’’ Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). Accord Dighton v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 687, 694 (1987); G.J.T., Inc. v. Boston Licensing Bd., 397 Mass. 285, 293 (1986). Ordinarily, if the language of a statute is unambiguous, it is conclusive as to “the purpose of its framers.” See, e.g., Boston Neighborhood Taxi Ass’n v. Department of Pub. Utils., ante 686; Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977). It is not the plain meaning of the statute, however, that drives the court to its conclusion, but the incremental logic of our own decisions superimposed upon the statutory language to achieve a result not contemplated by, and beyond the design of, the legislative enactment. Moreover, “time and again we have stated that we should not accept the literal meaning of the words of a statute without regard for that statute’s purpose and history.” Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 397 Mass. 837, 839 (1986), and cases cited. Accord Quincy City Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm’n, 406 Mass. 431, 443 (1990).

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