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still lose, based on the numerous cases that apply the rule that the anti-SLAPP statute
does apply where any allegations of protected activity are only incidental to the thrust of
the complaint. (Dyer v. Childress, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279.). Four illustrations
should suffice.
In re Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, which was a national
church’s action to recover parish property after the parish disaffiliated itself from national
church, which disaffiliation was caused by protected activity related to a doctrinal
dispute. Held: the case did not arise from such protected activity, as the gravamen or
principal thrust of the action was a property dispute, not a dispute over religious doctrine
or other protected activity. (Id. at pp. 477–478.)
Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, where
a seller of real property brought an action against the buyer, the city, and city officials for
breach of contract, fraud, and related causes of action, in which some of the actions
complained of related to defendants’ conduct in obtaining and issuing permits. Held: the
thrust of the action did not “arise” from these activities. (Id. at p. 799.)
Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 154, where tenants
brought a declaratory relief action after the landlord served them with notice under a
statute (Govt. Code, section 7060 et seq.) that permits landlords to evict tenants under
certain conditions, even if prohibited by local rent control ordinance—an action instituted
in response to service of the notice, a protected activity. Held: the action did not “arise”
from the protected activity, as the thrust of the action was whether the landlord could
evict tenants. (Id. at pp. 160–161.)
City of Alhambra v. D’Ausilio (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1301, where plaintiff sued
for declaratory relief to obtain a determination that defendant’s conduct (involvement in
protests) constituted breach of a settlement agreement. Held: not an anti-SLAPP suit.
Although the conduct constituted an exercise of the constitutional right of free speech, the
cause of action did not arise from that exercise, but rather from a controversy between the
parties as to the scope of the settlement agreement. (Id. at p. 1308.)