6
Because these meritless lawsuits seek to deplete “the defendant’s energy” and drain “his
or her resources” [citation], the Legislature sought “ ‘to prevent SLAPPs by ending them
early and without great cost to the SLAPP target’ ” [citation]. Section 425.16 therefore
establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a
summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.’ [Citation.]
“Finally, and as subdivision (a) of section 425.16 expressly mandates, the section
‘shall be construed broadly.’
“With these principles in mind, we turn to a review of the issues before us, a
review that is de novo. [Citation.]” (Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher
Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 463-464.)
Moriarty’s Complaint Is Not Subject to the Anti-SLAPP
Statute As It Is Not Based on Protected Activity
As indicated above, Judge Quidachy concluded that Laramar had failed to meet its
burden under the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, failing to demonstrate that
Moriarty’s complaint was based on protected activity. We reach the same conclusion.
Laramar’s brief is correct in two respects. First, prosecution of an unlawful
detainer action is “indisputedly protected activity” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP
statute, as we ourselves have held. (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Association (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1479, citing Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275
(Birkner).) Second, “Application of section 425.16 does not depend on the form or label
of plaintiff’s cause of action, but rather on ‘the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his
or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or
petitioning.’ ”
But those principles, essentially black letter law, are unavailing here, as Laramar
fails the most fundamental requirement—demonstrating that Moriarty’s lawsuit is based
on the unlawful detainer action. It is not.
In order for a complaint to be within the anti-SLAPP statute, the “critical
consideration . . . is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free
speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) To make