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defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” [¶] Defendants have fallen
victim to the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc—because the notices preceded
plaintiffs’ complaint the notices must have caused plaintiffs’ complaint. The filing and
service of the notices may have triggered plaintiffs’ complaint and the notices may be
evidence in support of plaintiffs’ complaint, but they were not the cause of plaintiffs’
complaint. Clearly, the cause of plaintiffs’ complaint was defendants’ allegedly wrongful
reliance on the Ellis Act as their authority for terminating plaintiffs’ tenancy.
Terminating a tenancy or removing a property from the rental market are not activities
taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech.’ (Marlin,
supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 160-161, fns. omitted).
“In January 2009, perhaps the most pertinent of the appellate decisions discussing
the application (or lack thereof) of the SLAPP statute to landlord-tenant disputes was
published. It is Clark v. Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281 (Clark). There, as here, a
tenant sued her landlord for fraud and unlawful eviction after the landlord evicted her,
allegedly to make the rental unit available to the landlord’s daughter; the latter never
happened. The trial court granted the landlord’s SLAPP motion, holding that the tenant’s
complaint was essentially based on the landlord’s privileged communications. Again, the
Second District reversed. In so doing, it held that although ‘[t]here is no question that the
prosecution of an unlawful detainer action is indisputably protected activity within the
meaning of section 425.16,’ on the facts before it, the tenant’s complaint was ‘not
premised on Mazgani’s protected activities of initiating or prosecuting the unlawful
detainer action, but on her removal of the apartment from the rental market and
fraudulent eviction of Clark for the purpose of installing a family member who never
moved in.’ (Clark, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286.)
“Quoting Marlin, the Clark court continued: ‘ “Terminating a tenancy or removing
a property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the
constitutional rights of petition or free speech.” [Citations.] “ ‘[T]he mere fact that an
action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from
that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ” [Citation.] The pivotal