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forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action” must itself have been an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ (Equilon Enterprises, LLC v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.) “[T]hat a cause of action arguably may
have been ‘triggered’ by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from such.
[Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of
action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.”
(Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)
Those are the cases that would apply to Moriarty’s eleventh cause of action. They
do not help Laramar.
In a similar fashion, Laramar then asserts, again conclusorily, that “Plaintiff’s
Second Cause of Action, which asserts a claim for ‘Negligent Violation of Statutory
Duty/Negligence Per Se’ is expressly based on the eviction. After incorporating all of the
previous fact allegations (Complaint, ¶ 68 [AA 17]), Plaintiff generally alleges that
Laramar breached its duty of due care and violated statutory duties by ‘violating certain
housing, building and fire codes, local ordinances and state statutes.’ (Complaint, ¶ 69
[AA 17].) But in the next paragraph, Plaintiff specifically pleads that ‘Defendants
violated their duty of care to Plaintiff and violated their statutory duties to Plaintiff by
failing to state just cause for the eviction of Plaintiff or offer any relocation benefits as
proscribed under San Francisco Administrative code §37.9C.’ (Complaint, ¶ 70,
emphasis added [AA 17].) This same allegation is subsequently incorporated into all of
Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action. (See, Complaint, ¶¶ 73, 82, 89, 95, 100, 104, 107,
123 and 128 [AA 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25].) Therefore, it is clear that this cause of action is
based at least in part on protected conduct by the Defendants.”
Then, Laramar goes on to discuss other causes of action, which Laramar describes
this way: “[a]lthough disguised, [Moriarty’s] other causes of action also arise from the
same petitioning activity, and are also subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.” The primary
basis of Laramar’s argument is that “all prior allegations” are incorporated in the
complaint “(which includes his eviction from the unit.)” And so, Laramar sums up,
“Thus, in material part, each of Plaintiff’s causes of action is premised on the three day