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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Moriarty v. Laramar Mgmt. Corp. (2014)

Citation
Moriarty v. Laramar Mgmt. Corp. (2014)
Parent Document
Moriarty v. Laramar Mgmt. Corp. (2014)
Jurisdiction
California (state)
Effective Date
2014-02-26

Full Text

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       The complaint was apparently served on only two of the named defendants:
2363 Van Ness Avenue LLC and Laramar Management Corporation.
                                  The Proceedings Below
       On September 25, 2012, Laramar Management Corporation (hereafter, usually
Laramar) filed a motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16
(section 425.16), the anti-SLAPP statute.1 The motion was accompanied by a
memorandum of points and authorities and the declaration of Laramar’s attorney,
Curtis P. Dowling. As pertinent here, Mr. Dowling’s testimony was that in June 2011 he
had filed an unlawful detainer action against Moriarty; that in July 2011, the court
entered Moriarty’s default; and that Moriarty’s later motion to set aside the default was
denied. Mr. Dowling’s declaration had attached various exhibits, one of which was a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Moriarty filed on behalf of Laramar Urban
Specialty Partners.
       The essence of Laramar’s anti-SLAPP motion was, as distilled in its brief here,
this: “Laramar argued that Plaintiff’s complaint was premised in material part upon
Laramar’s alleged pursuit of the eviction action and the ensuing judgment for possession,
that the eviction action and judgment were not ‘merely incidental’ to Plaintiff’s claims,
and that Plaintiff could not demonstrate a prima facie case against Laramar because his
claims are barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code § 47 and by the doctrines of
claim and issue preclusion. [AA 30-49.]”
       Moriarty filed opposition, along with objections to evidence. The motion came on
for hearing on November 29, 2012, before the Honorable Ronald Quidachy, an
experienced law and motion judge, who, following a hearing, denied Laramar’s motion,
concluding as follows: “The Court concludes that the Moving Parties failed to carry its
burden to show that the Plaintiff’s Complaint arises out of protected activity. [¶] We
went through this Complaint in detail, trying to see how this might be protected
activity. . . . [¶] The drafters of the Complaint did an excellent job in making sure that this