Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)

Citation: Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Parent Document: Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2009-10-09
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3065171/barrientos-v-1801-1825-morton-llc/ ↗

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[14] Morton contends that Tenants’ action is not an “action
on a contract” because Tenants sued to enforce their rights
under federal housing law and LARSO. We disagree. In
Lafarge, we awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff for oppos-
ing the defendant’s motion to vacate an arbitration award,
which was based on a contract. We held that “the underlying
contract between the parties is not collateral to the proceed-
ings but plays an integral part in defining the rights of the par-
ties.” Id. at 1340. By contrast, in In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738
               BARRIENTOS v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC                   14453
(9th Cir. 1985), relied upon by Morton, we refused to award
debtors attorney’s fees for opposing the creditors’ unsuccess-
ful motion for relief from an automatic stay. We held that
because the “[s]tay litigation is limited to issues of the lack of
adequate protection, the debtor’s equity in the property, and
the necessity of the property to an effective reorganization,”
“[t]he validity of the . . . contract underlying the claim is not
litigated during the hearing.” Id. at 740. Here, Tenants’ lease
contracts are not collateral to the litigation because they incor-
porate and define the rights and obligations of Tenants and
Morton, the applicability of relevant federal and state law, and
the role of federal and state actors. Thus, Tenants’ action for
a declaratory judgment regarding their right to remain in their
apartments is properly considered an action “on a contract.”
As the district court noted, Tenants’ “complaint was one to
enforce their rights as tenants under the lease.”

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