Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)

Citation: Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Parent Document: Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2009-10-09
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3065171/barrientos-v-1801-1825-morton-llc/ ↗

Full Text

1,966 chars

The district court reasoned “that this case presents a ques-
tion more like the one in de la Cuesta than in Hammond,”
because, as in de la Cuesta, where the state deprived owners
of the flexibility in choosing whether to utilize the due-on-
sale clauses, LARSO deprived owners of the flexibility in
choosing whether to terminate tenants in order to increase the
rent. de la Cuesta and Hammond, however, suggest the oppo-
site reading. The federal agency in Hammond set forth an
exception (clean discharge permissible) to a federal prohibi-
tion (no discharge), that the state law took away. Similarly,
HUD set forth an exception (termination to increase the rent
permissible) to a federal prohibition (no termination without
good cause), that LARSO took away. On this reading, this
case is more like Hammond and less like de la Cuesta, in
which the federal agency permitted an action (inclusion of
due-on-sale clauses) that the state forbade. In addition, the de
la Cuesta Court relied heavily on the “unambiguous” intent of
the federal agency to preempt contrary state law. 458 U.S. at
154-59; see also id. at 158 (“The preamble unequivocally
expresses the Board’s determination to displace state law.”).
That sort of unambiguous intent, as explained above, is not
present here. Further, the district court’s finding of conflict
was based on its conclusion that “LARSO takes away a right
specifically granted by the HUD eviction regulations.” How-
ever, as in Hammond, where it was “difficult to argue con-
vincingly that the Congress or the Coast Guard intended to
14446          BARRIENTOS v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC
create a federal right to discharge ballast containing oil into
a state’s coastal waters,” 726 F.2d at 499, it is similarly diffi-
cult to argue, given the statutory context and legislative and
administrative history, that Congress or HUD intended to
create a “federal right” to terminate assisted tenants in order
to raise the rent on their units.

Other Sections in This Document (60)

Full Text