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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)

Citation
Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Parent Document
Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Effective Date
2009-10-09

Other Sections in This Document (60)

Full Text

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Along with Congress, “a federal agency acting within the
scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt
             BARRIENTOS v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC             14439
state regulation.” City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64
(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when “Con-
gress has entrusted an agency with the task of promulgating
regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute, . . . as part
of the pre-emption analysis we must consider whether the reg-
ulations evidence a desire to occupy a field completely.” R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, N.C., 479 U.S.
130, 149 (1986) (citation omitted). However, a reviewing
court does not “focus on Congress’ intent to supersede state
law” because “[a] pre-emptive regulation’s force does not
depend on express congressional authorization to displace
state law.” de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154. Instead, the court
asks “whether the [federal agency] meant to pre-empt [the
state law], and, if so, whether that action is within the scope
of the [federal agency’s] delegated authority.” Id. When one
“of the responsibilities conferred on federal agencies
involve[s] a broad grant of authority to reconcile conflicting
policies,” the court must uphold the federal regulation “if the
agency’s choice to pre-empt represents a reasonable accom-
modation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency’s care by the statute.” City of N.Y., 486 U.S. at 64
(internal quotation marks omitted). The regulation is invalid
if “it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanc-
tioned.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).