Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)

Citation: Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Parent Document: Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2009-10-09
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3065171/barrientos-v-1801-1825-morton-llc/ ↗

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[11] The position of the United States is entitled to defer-
ence, as is HUD’s most recent guidance document. “[W]hen
an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which
then interpret ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to
its reasonable interpretations.” Fed. Express Corp. v. Holo-
wecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1154 (2008). “[T]he agency is entitled
14450        BARRIENTOS v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC
to further deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation
of regulations it has put in force.” Id. at 1155 (citing Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (deferring to the agency’s
position unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation” (internal quotation marks omitted))). Further, an
agency’s litigation position in an amicus brief is entitled to
deference if there is “no reason to suspect that the interpreta-
tion does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judg-
ment on the matter.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 462. And, as explained
above, the interpretive policy statements are at least “entitled
to a measure of respect under the less deferential Skidmore
standard.” Fed. Express Corp., 128 S. Ct. at 1156 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Of course, we do not defer “to an
agency’s conclusion that state law is pre-empted. Rather, we
have attended to an agency’s explanation of how state law
affects the regulatory scheme.” Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
Agencies “have a unique understanding of the statutes they
administer and an attendant ability to make informed determi-
nations about how state requirements may pose an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 68
(2002); Geier, 529 U.S. at 883. Moreover, while “[t]he weight
we accord the agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on
the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency,
and persuasiveness,” Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201, HUD has
amply demonstrated its thoughtful consideration of, and its
commitment to, the principle that local eviction control laws
that are more protective of tenants are not preempted by its
own “good cause” regulation.

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