Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)

Citation: Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Parent Document: Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC (2009)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2009-10-09
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3065171/barrientos-v-1801-1825-morton-llc/ ↗

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The district court granted summary judgment to Tenants,
concluding that the Eviction Notices violated the Enhanced
Voucher Tenants’ statutory right to remain in their apartments
despite rent increases under § 1437f(t)(1)(B),3 that LARSO
and HUD are in actual conflict, but that HUD’s definition of
“good cause,” insofar as it includes the desire to raise the rent,
exceeded HUD’s statutory authority.4 We affirm summary
judgment and the entry of the permanent injunction on some-
what different grounds. See Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Meyling, 146 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(“[W]e can affirm on any ground supported by the record.”).
Though we agree that the eviction violated the Enhanced
Voucher Tenants’ right to remain, we hold that LARSO is not
preempted by HUD’s “good cause” regulation because it does
not actually conflict with the federal regulation.
  3
     The district court had ruled that the Enhanced Voucher Tenants were
protected from eviction by § 1437f(t)(1)(B) itself, which “ensured that
assisted families could remain in tenancy, even when the owner exits the
assistance program.” Judge Wardlaw would affirm this holding, which
provides an additional layer of protection to the Enhanced Voucher Ten-
ants over that provided by LARSO. Judges O’Scannlain and Rymer would
not reach the statutory right to remain issue, because under the particular
facts of this case, LARSO precludes eviction for the purpose of rent
increases.
   4
     The district court’s judgment assumes that Morton intended to termi-
nate the tenancies for the sole purpose of raising the rent. In its motion for
reconsideration, Morton argued that it was also motivated by the desire to
rid itself of various section 8 compliance costs. The district court rejected
this late assertion, finding that Morton put forth no evidence of compli-
ance costs, but that in any case, a bare desire to leave the section 8 pro-
gram does not constitute “good cause.” On appeal, Morton does not
dispute that both sets of Notices were solely motivated by its desire to
raise the rent. Nor does Morton address the district court’s finding that a
bare desire to withdraw from the program cannot constitute “good cause.”
Therefore, we also assume that Morton’s only reason for eviction was the
desire to raise the rent.
14438        BARRIENTOS v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC
A.      Federal Preemption of LARSO

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