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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Section 8

Citation
Section 8
Parent Document
Park Village Apartment Tenants Ass'n v. Mortimer Howard Trust, 636 F.3d 1150 (2011)
Effective Date
2011-02-25

Other Sections in This Document (141)

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We disagree with our dissenting colleague’s conclusion
that the injunction is appropriate because the plaintiffs’ statu-
tory “right to remain” necessarily includes an implied statu-
tory right to “adequate heat and hot water, lighting, air
quality, sanitary conditions, and building security.” Dissent at
2930-31. As our colleague correctly acknowledges, “[t]he
statute nowhere explicitly requires an owner to enter into a
HAP contract.” Id. Moreover, the sections of the statute on
which he relies as the conceptual underpinning for his view
of implied rights by definition speak only to the time period
when the owner has not yet lawfully opted out of the Section
8 program—a time when a HAP contract is clearly required.
See id. The Dissent doesn’t say so, but since he is conjuring
up out of whole cloth the costly implied rights he finds, those
implied rights could be significantly expanded by the PHA
(all in the name of furthering its mission) to render essentially
worthless an owner’s right to lawfully opt-out of its involve-
ment in the Section 8 program (subject to certain tenants’
           PARK VILLAGE v. MORTIMER HOWARD TRUST            2925
right to remain in the Apartments, as provided supra). Such
uncabined, implied rights could also frustrate Congress’s clear
intention in the 1996 amendments to the Act to end so-called
“endless leases,” under which owners could not refuse to
renew the leases of Section 8 tenants at the conclusion of a
lease term, except as otherwise provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii) (repealed 1996), and the “take one, take
all” provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(A) (repealed 1996),
which effectively provided that “once a landlord [had chosen]
to participate by accepting a Section 8 tenant, it [could] not
turn away subsequent Section 8 certificate holders based on
their status as Section 8 participants.” Salute v. Stratford
Greens, 918 F. Supp 660, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d sub
nom. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.
3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Salute v. Stratford Greens
Garden Apartments, 136 F. 3d at 300 (noting that repeal of
these provisions reflects a clear “congressional intent that the
burdens of Section 8 participation are substantial enough that
participation should not be forced on landlords”).