Section 2
- Citation
- Section 2
- Parent Document
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 1975-10-06
Other Sections in This Document (195)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
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Full Text
569 chars[15] Nor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which quoted the Joiner dictum. Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should be disregarded for substance," 389 U. S., at 336, and only after analyzing the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in substance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock," a "certificate of interest or participation in [a] profit-sharing agreement," and a "transferable share."