Section 2
- Citation
- Section 2
- Parent Document
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 1975-10-06
Other Sections in This Document (195)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
- United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
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Full Text
728 charsThe Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an “investment contract” as defined by the Securities Acts. Respondents further argue that in any event what they agreed to purchase is “commonly known as a ‘security’ ” within the meaning of these laws. In considering these claims we again must examine the substance — the economic realities of the transaction — rather than the *852names that may have been employed by the parties. We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, between an “investment contract” and an “instrument commonly known as a ‘security.’ ” In either case, the basic test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings is