Luz Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)

Citation: Luz Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)
Parent Document: Luz Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1998-12-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/759590/luz-gonzalez-v-lee-county-housin... ↗

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Although Gonzalez herself did not cite § 100.400(c)(3) before the district court or initially on appeal, we must evaluate the clearly defined scope of § 3617 sua sponte, regardless of whether the implementing regulation was proffered as relevant legal authority. In Elder v. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir.1991), rev'd, 510 U.S. 510, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994), the plaintiff in a § 1983 action appealed the district court's determination that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff failed to inform either the district court or the Ninth Circuit of factually similar pre-existing case law that indicated the illegality of the defendants' actions. See id. at 1390. Although the Ninth Circuit noted that a pre-existing case appeared to proscribe defendants' actions, see id. at 1391, the court held that a plaintiff may not benefit on appeal from precedent that neither he nor the district court cited. See id. at 1394-96. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an appellate court is required to determine the clearly established law sua sponte, based on "its 'full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents,' " 510 U.S. at 516, 114 S.Ct. at 1023 (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3018 n. 9, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)) (brackets in Elder). Accordingly, we must determine the clearly established contours of § 3617 sua sponte

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