Luz Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)

Citation: Luz Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)
Parent Document: Luz Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1998-12-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/759590/luz-gonzalez-v-lee-county-housin... ↗

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The special concurrence argues that section 100.400(c)(3) "should not be deemed the source of clearly established law" because no authoritative case has yet approved it as valid or applied it to a specific set of facts. Special Concurrence at 1311.42 Moran has conceded, however, "that the validity of [section] 100.400(c)(3) under Chevron would have been apparent to a reasonable public official in 1995." Moran Supp. Br. at 5.43 Moran also should not have needed a court to explain to her that the regulation applied to the facts alleged here. The regulation states that section 3617 prohibits dismissing an employee for "assist[ing] a person seeking access to the ... rental of a dwelling ... because of the race ... of that person or of any person associated with that person." This language unmistakably instructs that it is illegal to fire an employee for refusing to discriminate against prospective tenants on the basis of race.44 Where, as here, a regulation plainly and specifically describes a public official's behavior, the official is on notice that she is subject to liability for its violation, and thus, that she will not be able to claim qualified immunity.

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