Gallagher v. Magner Ex Rel. City of St. Paul's Department of Neighborhood Housing & Property Improvement, 619 F.3d 823 (2010)

Citation: Gallagher v. Magner Ex Rel. City of St. Paul's Department of Neighborhood Housing & Property Improvement, 619 F.3d 823 (2010)
Parent Document: Gallagher v. Magner Ex Rel. City of St. Paul's Department of Neighborhood Housing & Property Improvement, 619 F.3d 823 (2010)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2010-09-01
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/174536/gallagher-v-magner-ex-rel-city-o... ↗

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Appellants argue that the City’s use of Code Compliance Certification violated
the Minnesota State Building Code by requiring properties to satisfy current building
code standards, thereby removing “grandfathered” protections under state law.
Appellants have articulated this claim under the doctrine of preemption. See generally
City of Morris v. SAX Invs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2008) (holding that the
Minnesota State Building Code expressly preempts a city’s licensing ordinances for
rental properties). We do not reach Appellants’ preemption arguments because they
are not before the Court. We have reviewed the latest amended complaints in these
actions, which total 228 pages, and even the most liberal construction of the
complaints does not indicate a preemption claim. Indeed, the amended complaints do
not even allege that the City has violated state law, let alone state “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that [Appellants are] entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). As such, Appellants’ preemption arguments are inapposite to the causes
of action before the Court. We note that Appellants may amend their complaint on
remand, see City of Columbia, Mo. v. Paul N. Howard Co., 707 F.2d 338, 341 (8th
Cir. 1983) ("An amendment can be proper after remand to the district court even if the
claim was presented for the first time on appeal or had not been presented to the
district court in a timely fashion."), and also that our partial affirmance of summary
judgment in this case is without prejudice to any preemption claim that may be
available in state court. -29-
III. Spoliation-of-Evidence Sanctions

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