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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Stevens v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND, IND., 663 F.3d 300 (2011)

Citation
Stevens v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND, IND., 663 F.3d 300 (2011)
Parent Document
Stevens v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND, IND., 663 F.3d 300 (2011)
Effective Date
2011-12-01

Other Sections in This Document (42)

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are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.” Gates, 623 F.3d at 413 (citing
United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). According
to Stevens, the court improperly construed the facts
in favor of the defendant when it found that Stevens
“voluntarily” left HASB property after the Second and
Third Notices and thus suffered no damages from the
First Notice. She maintains that her departure was not
voluntary but was forced by the Second and Third
Notices, each of which demanded that she vacate the
property within thirty days. As Stevens notes, the
district court acknowledged this in a footnote:
     The term “voluntary” is not being used to suggest
     that Plaintiff wanted to leave, rather, that she was
     not forced to leave by any court order or physical use
     of force. Plaintiff continues to contend that her
     move was not voluntary in the sense that she only
     left because the notice informed her that she had to
     move within 30 days.
Stevens v. Housing Auth. of South Bend, 720 F.Supp.2d 1013,
1020 n.4 (N.D. Ind. 2010). Stevens contends that because
her departure was involuntary, a live dispute remains
and the case is not moot.
  The defendant, on the other hand, insists that Stevens
voluntarily vacated the apartment because she simply
decided to leave. Having voluntarily left, HASB
contends that her claims relating to the First Notice are
moot. The source of the confusion is apparent: Stevens’
departure was not voluntary in the colloquial sense of
No. 10-2724                                              13