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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988)

Citation
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988)
Parent Document
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988)
Effective Date
1988-02-24

Other Sections in This Document (112)

Full Text

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Turning now to the merits, we first address appellants’ contention that application of the Ordinance’s tenant hardship provisions violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend*9ments’ prohibition against taking of private property for public use without just compensation. In essence, appellants’ claim is as follows: §5703.28 of the Ordinance establishes the seven factors that a hearing officer is to take into account in determining the reasonable rent increase. The first six of these factors are all objective, and are related either to the landlord’s costs of providing an adequate rental unit, or to the condition of the rental market. Application of these six standards results in a rent that is “reasonable” by reference to what appellants contend is the only legitimate purpose of rent control: the elimination of “excessive” rents caused by San Jose’s housing shortage. When the hearing officer then takes into account “hardship to a tenant” pursuant to § 5703.28(c)(7) and reduces the rent below the objectively “reasonable” amount established by the first six factors, this additional reduction in the rent increase constitutes a “taking.” This taking is impermissible because it does not serve the purpose of eliminating excessive rents — that objective has already been accomplished by considering the first six factors — instead, it serves only the purpose of providing assistance to “hardship tenants.” In short, appellants contend, the additional reduction of rent on grounds of hardship accomplishes a transfer of the landlord’s property to individual hardship tenants; the Ordinance forces private individuals to shoulder the “public” burden of subsidizing their poor tenants’ housing. As appellants point out, “[i]t is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation provision is ‘designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 318-319 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960)).