Granberry v. Islay Investments, 161 Cal. App. 3d 382 (1984)

Citation: Granberry v. Islay Investments, 161 Cal. App. 3d 382 (1984)
Parent Document: Granberry v. Islay Investments, 161 Cal. App. 3d 382 (1984)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 1984-10-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2176569/granberry-v-islay-investments/ ↗

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The sweeping definition of security contained in the statute makes it an elusive concept. The trier of fact may face a difficult task in trying to distinguish between a security and rent. Islay and plaintiffs each offer their own definition of either security or rent in the context of the statute. Their critiques of each other’s definition are more persuasive than their definitions. Islay borrows its definition from Professor Coskran (see fn. 6) and argues that a security can only be used by the landlord for those purposes set forth in the examples in subdivisions (b) and (e) of Civil Code section 1950.5. Any other payment, it argues, is not a security unless it is shown to have been taken to secure the execution of a lease. As plaintiffs point out, this constricted view ties the definition of security to purpose, which is what the statute disallows. This narrow view of a security would permit a landlord to escape the provisions of the statute by merely calling a payment rent so that it does not fall within the limited examples contained in the statute.

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