Section 4

Citation: Section 4
Parent Document: Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal. 4th 1232 (2007)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2007-08-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5608052/action-apartment-assn-v-city-of... ↗

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In this case, plaintiffs did not wait until the City brought an action under the relevant provisions of the Tenant Harassment ordinance to raise the defense of the litigation privilege, but instead sought prospective relief declaring that the litigation privilege would be a successful defense to such an action. It is well established that parties may seek declaratory relief with respect to the interpretation and application of local ordinances. (See, e.g., Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 637 [12 Cal.Rptr. 671, 361 P.2d 247] [“The interpretation of ordinances and statutes are proper matters for declaratory relief.”]; California Water & Tel. Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 24 [61 Cal.Rptr. 618] [“A person need not violate or plan to violate a penal ordinance before he can obtain a declaration construing it and deciding its application to him.”].) It is also well established that preemption, like other affirmative defenses, may be raised in a complaint seeking declaratory or other prospective relief. (Malish v. City of San Diego (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 725 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 18]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374 [119 L.Ed.2d 157, 112 S.Ct. 2031].) Thus, we do not convert the litigation privilege from a “shield” into a “sword,” as Justice Corrigan contends, but instead clarify when the use of the litigation privilege as a “shield” is effective. (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 1253.)

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