Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal. 4th 1232 (2007)

Citation: Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal. 4th 1232 (2007)
Parent Document: Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal. 4th 1232 (2007)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2007-08-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5608052/action-apartment-assn-v-city-of... ↗

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The City argues that the gravamen of initiating an eviction action is improperly terminating a tenancy because such initiations, without more, frequently cause tenants to terminate their tenancies. It argues that a landlord who violates section 4.56.020(i)(l) engages in a “course of conduct designed to wrest a tenant from his or her home without complying with legal requirements.” We have drawn “a careful distinction between a cause of action based squarely on a privileged communication, such as an action for defamation, and one based upon an underlying course of conduct evidenced by the communication.” (White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, *1249888 [221 Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309].) “As a general rule, the privilege ‘ “applies only to communicative acts and does not privilege tortious courses of conduct.” ’ ” (Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, 830 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 69 P.3d 927], quoting LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 345 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539].) For example, in LiMandri, the Court of Appeal held that the litigation privilege did not bar plaintiff’s “cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations because it [was] based upon an alleged tortious course of conduct,” including the preparation and execution of documents creating a security interest in a portion of settlement proceeds and the “refusal to concede the superiority of [plaintiff’s] contractual lien.” (LiMandri, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.)

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