Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)

Citation: Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)
Parent Document: Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 1997-08-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5607899/kavanau-v-santa-monica-rent-con... ↗

Full Text

1,129 chars

It is admittedly true that Supreme Court precedent is not entirely clear on where substantive due process ends and takings law begins. In the area of land-use regulation, the court has held that a general zoning law is a taking of property if it “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.” (Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106].) Whether and to what extent this standard differs from the ordinary substantive due process “rationally related” standard is a question beyond the scope of this opinion. The “substantially advance” standard has not been applied by the Supreme Court outside the special area of forced dedications of property in exchange for development permits. (See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, supra, 483 U.S. 825; Dolan v. City of Tigard, supra, 512 U.S. 374.) In any case, the Supreme Court has not indicated any intent to *791extend the “substantially advance” test beyond the realm of zoning and similar laws which restrict the use of land, and has not applied such a test to price regulations. (See fn. 1, ante). --- 040dissent by Baxter ---

Other Sections in This Document (115)

Full Text