Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)

Citation: Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)
Parent Document: Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 1997-08-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5607899/kavanau-v-santa-monica-rent-con... ↗

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The notion that rent control laws may now be subject to a more exacting form of constitutional scrutiny is predicated on a reading of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n (1987) 483 U.S. 825 [107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677]. (See Radford, Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990’s: The Death of Rent Control?, supra, 22 Sw.U.L.Rev. at p. 1030.) We have rejected elsewhere the contention that Nollan and the related case of Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 [114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304] represent a new standard of scrutiny of government regulation other than those regulations that require either a physical dedication of property, or a development fee levied on an “individual and discretionary basis.” (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854, 876 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429].) In the present case, rent control neither requires a physical dedication nor amounts to an individual and discretionary development fee. ¿ideed, as explained above, it is not a land-use regulation at all but a form of price control.

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