Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)

Citation: Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)
Parent Document: Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 1997-08-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5607899/kavanau-v-santa-monica-rent-con... ↗

Full Text

904 chars

The term “due process” has at least two distinct meanings or applications in the field of rate regulation: (1) substantive due process, i.e., whether the scheme of regulation in question is “ ‘ “arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt . . . ” (Pennell v. San Jose (1988) 485 U.S. 1, 11 [108 S.Ct. 849, 857, 99 L.Ed.2d 1] (Pennell)); (2) what can be termed “confiscatory” due process, i.e., whether a given scheme of rate regulation, although not per se or facially invalid, is confiscatory in its result and has prevented an opportunity to obtain a just and reasonable rate of return on investment. (See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch (1989) 488 U.S. 299, 307-308 [109 S.Ct. 609, 615, 102 L.Ed.2d 646] (Duquesne Light Co.).) As explained below, it is this latter confiscatory due process analysis that significantly overlaps the takings clause.

Other Sections in This Document (115)

Full Text