Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Citation
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Parent Document
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1978-09-28
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1160324/hale-v-morgan/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (116)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
- Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512 (1978)
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Full Text
1,902 charsWe are unable to accept this analysis for several reasons. On its very face, section 789.3 makes no such distinction between “landlords.” It applies to all of them and treats them equally. Further, a constitutional distinction between those persons who have actual knowledge of a law and those who do not, directly offends the fundamental principle that, in the absence of specific language to the contrary, ignorance of a law is not a defense to a charge of its violation. (People v. O’Brien (1892) 96 Cal. 171, 176 [31 P. 45]; People v. Brocklehurst (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 473, 476 [92 Cal.Rptr. 340]; People v. Evans (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 254, 260 [57 Cal.Rptr. 276]; People v. Marschalk (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 346, 350 [23 Cal.Rptr. 743].) Speaking many years ago within a criminal context, we amplified the principle in this way: “It is an emphatic postulate of both civil and penal law that ignorance of a law is no excuse for a violation thereof. Of course it is based on a fiction, because no man can know all the law, but it is a maxim which the law itself does not permit any one to gainsay. . . . The rule rests on public necessity; the welfare of society and the safety of the state depend upon its enforcement. ... [If permitted] the plea [of ignorance] would be universally made, and would lead to interminable questions incapable of solution. Was the defendant in fact ignorant of the law? Was his ignorance of the law excusable? The denser the ignorancé the greater would be the exemption from liability. The absurdity of such a condition of the law is shown in the consummate satire of Pascal, where, speaking upon this subject, he says, in substance, that although the less a man thinks of the moral law the more culpable he is, yet under municipal law ‘the more he relieves himself from a knowledge of his duty, the more approvedly is his duty performed.’ ” (O’Brien, supra, at p. 176.)