Even more significant, the judgments produced by, and subject to, such stipulations as those in Exhibit A, would be void in any event insofar as they purport to terminate the respective defendants’ tenancies and grant respondent a legally enforceable right to dispossess them at any future time without notice or hearing should they fail, for however valid a reason, to pay their monthly installment tributes to him. Manifestly, such a proviso, if afforded any validity whatsoever, would utterly destroy all known rights of landlord and tenant. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 1941 [landlord’s duty to repair], 1942 [tenant’s right to withhold rent], 1942.5 [retaliatory eviction], 1944-1945.5 [presumed rental periods and automatic renewal of tenancy], 1946 [notice of termination of tenancy]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. 2 [notice to quit].) No court may lend its offices and powers to such a scheme. (3) “. . . ‘It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion at any time after its entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the order. [Citations.]’ ” (Hayashi v. Lorenz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 848, 851 [271 P.2d 18].)