Rich v. Schwab, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170 (1998)

Citation: Rich v. Schwab, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170 (1998)
Parent Document: Rich v. Schwab, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170 (1998)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 1998-06-01
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2252538/rich-v-schwab/ ↗

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Where, as here, the Legislature has set the level of punishment which may be imposed for a particular act, the doctrine of separation of powers limits the nature of our review when such a penalty has in fact been imposed. We are required to "`accord "substantial deference" to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.'" (BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1603, 134 L.Ed.2d 809.) As with any other statute, we may interfere with the Legislature's determination of what is required by the public interest only when there is no rationale basis for the decision reached by Legislature. (Horeczko v. State Bd. of Registration (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1352, 1358, 284 Cal.Rptr. 149.) Here, the maximum potential penalty for each violation, $1,000, is in no sense disproportionate to the annual rent collected on typical commercial, residential or agricultural leaseholds covered by the terms of section 1942.5 or disproportionate to the public interest in deterring retaliatory conduct by landlords. Given the relatively low limit imposed and the well-established public interest in regulating real property leases, we are in no position to add any general requirement that a tenant also show the financial condition of his landlord before the penalties authorized by section 1942.5, subdivision (f), may be imposed. Presumably, the Legislature considered the potential impact on landlords in setting the very specific monetary parameters which exist in the statute.

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