Appellant argues that filing a claim of right to possession was unnecessary because all he would have achieved was to be named as a defendant, and he was already named as a defendant. We reject this contention, and conclude that the statute literally and logically applies to appellant’s case. The statute specifies the procedure for a tenant in possession who is not named in the landlords’ judgment for possession to make a claim of right to possession. Appellant was such a tenant. If appellant had engaged in the statutory procedure, he would have gained more than just becoming named as a defendant; the filing of the claim of right to possession also constitutes a general appearance. A general appearance by a defendant is tantamount to an answer, which controverts the allegations of the complaint, and here would place at issue which party had the superior right to possession. Once he made a general appearance, appellant would have had the right to be heard, with counsel. (§ 1174.3, subd. (b); Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, supra, 49 Cal.2d 668.)