Section 1942
- Citation
- Section 1942
- Parent Document
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1981-02-13
Other Sections in This Document (192)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
- Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (1981)
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Full Text
1,140 charsThis language from Standard Livestock Co. is not helpful in this case and does not support plaintiffs’ contention that the tenants were not entitled to assert as a defense in the present lawsuit a breach of the implied warranty of habitability by the current landlords. There is no cross-complaint by the tenants against a new landlord for damages caused by a previous owner. Nor is there any claim by the tenants for *57retroactive rent reductions for any period before the change of ownership. Therefore, it is unnecessary to decide such questions as the applicability of Civil Code section 823 to a tenant’s affirmative action against a new owner, or whether the implied warranty of habitability is an “agreement in the lease” or a covenant “relating to ... possession of the premises” within the meaning of that section. Similarly, this court need not decide the defendants’ contention that the products liability exception to the general rule against imposing liabilities of a predecessor corporation upon its successor should apply in landlord-tenant cases. (See Ray v. Alad Corp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 22 [136 Cal.Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3].)