The law generally does not require a person to perform an act which would benefit solely the actor if there is any risk to the actor. That is, it is not reasonable to require persons to undertake risks. Since the provisions of RPAPL 711 (subd 1) may not completely protect the landlord’s rights, the landlord need not rely on it. There is a possibility, however slight it may ultimately turn out to be, that the acceptance of rent under that section could result in waiver. For example if, after the acceptance of rent, the holdover petition was dismissed for failure to acquire personal jurisdiction over the tenant (a result which occurs with an unreasonably high degree of frequency in this court), the tenant might later argue that the landlord, who obviously had knowledge of the breach of the lease since he had commenced an action based upon it, knowingly accepted rent and waived the breach since no petition was validly “commenced”. Although that scenario appears not to have been decided in reported cases the risk of a result adverse to the landlord exists. A further risk is that the acceptance of rent at the. amount set in the lease might operate as a waiver of a subsequent claim for a use and occupation allowance in excess of that amount, if the landlord were to be successful in the holdover proceeding. *362(Cf. RPAPL 753, subd 2.) Again there is a litigation risk to a landlord. The respondent has proven no possible benefit to himself or any other tenant if the tendered rent was accepted. Nor has he offered any policy reason for imposing any risk on the petitioner. On the other hand, there are sound public policy reasons for the avoidance of complicated new issues in landlord-tenant litigation. The “summary” proceedings under the RPAPL are far from summary as any observer of this court can see; the law is far from the simple proceeding contemplated by the statute. Counsel for either landlords or tenants should not be required to hazard a guess at the outcome of novel legal questions when rent is tendered during a holdover proceeding. I find, therefore, that a delay of collecting rent is reasonable during a prior holdover proceeding. This result appears to be consistent with the Appellate Term’s conclusions in Thunderbird Realty Co. v Ahn (supra), and 177 East 90th St. v Devine (supra), where it found “ ‘vexatious litigation’ ” and the parties’ “continuous contention” in court to be a valid reason for refusing to accept rent. I find that it would serve future cases best be decided simply by excluding, as a matter of law, from a Gramford claim, the time from the notice to cure to the final decision in a holdover proceeding.