The petition here, which was later amended, sought 12 months’ rent at the time it was filed. The respondent relied on a line of cases, that has apparently held that a landlord who allows a substantial period to elapse before filing a summary proceeding has lost the right to resort to a *359summary proceeding under RPAPL article 7 to support his claim that the rent sought here is too “stale” to be the subject of a nonpayment proceeding under RPAPL article 7. (See, e.g„, Gramford Realty Corp. v Valentin, 71 Misc 2d 784; City of New York v Betancourt, 79 Miscc 2d 907 [App Term, 1st Dept.]; Antillean Holding Co. v Bindley, 76 Misc 2d 1044; New Approach Rehabilitation Corp. v Purdie, NYLJ, Dec. 29, 1980, p 13, col 5 [App Term, 2d Dept]; Maxwell v Simons, 77 Misc 2d 184.) The petitioner, on the other hand, cites cases such as 269 Assoc, v Yerkes (113 Misc 2d 450), which attack the Gramford line of authority; it also argues that its claim is not stale since the parties had been litigating a holdover proceeding for six of the months at issue. The respondent in an ingenious application of statutory construction replies that RPAPL 711 (subd 1), which authorizes the acceptance of rent after a holdover petition has been filed, makes the failure to accept tendered rent fatal to a subsequent nonpayment proceeding.