The Gramford line of cases appears to be inconsistent with each other; there is no single analytical thread which can be followed through them. Judge Saxe in 269 Assoc, v Yerkes (supra), and Judge Klein in Dedvukaj v Madonado (115 Misc 2d 211) both of this court have recently discussed Gramford (supra) and its progeny and have convincingly shown that there is a lack of uniformity in deciding what the rule is or what is its proper operation. Gramford itself, for example, described the staleness rule as one which was based on the inherent power of the court to prevent outrageously unfair, unjust results. That is, where a landlord has intentionally refused to pursue its remedy so that the tenant will ultimately be unable to satisfy a judgment, resort to a summary proceeding is barred as a result of the court’s sense of fairness. At the other extreme of the case lav/ is Maxwell v Simons (supra), which attempted to create an absolute three-month limit on the amount of rent which could be a predicate of a summary proceeding. Despite the attempted reliance on Maxwell by numerous practitioners in this court, the absolute time limit set up in Maxwell v Simons (supra), has been rejected at least in the First Department. (See, e.g., Trustees of C.I. Mtge. Group v *360NYILR Ltd., NYLJ, Dec. 8, 1978, p 6, col 3 [App Term, 1st Dept]; cf. Antillean Holding Co. v Lindley, supra.)