of-income discrimination under the Human Rights Act,”
Blodgett v. University Club, 930 A.2d 210, 220 (D.C. 2007), in
interpreting that Act it has “‘generally looked to cases from the
federal courts involving claims brought under [Title VII of] the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance,’” Nicola v. Washington
Times Corp., 947 A.2d 1164, 1171 (D.C. 2008) (quoting
Benefits Commc’n Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1301
(D.C. 1994)). And under Title VII, when a policy is
“discriminatory on its face,” the defendant’s motive is
irrelevant. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,
121 (1985); see Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (“[T]he absence of a malevolent
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a
neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Whether an
employment practice involves disparate treatment through
explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the
employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the
discrimination.”); see also Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978) (holding that an
employer’s policy requiring female employees to make larger
pension fund contributions than male employees was
discriminatory on its face in violation of Title VII).