Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)

Citation: Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)
Parent Document: Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2015-07-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2821966/waleska-velez-v-cuyahoga-metro-... ↗

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       The general definition adopted by the Supreme Court in the early portion of the twentieth century has been
adopted, unaltered, by other courts up to the present day, including this Court. See Wuebker v. C.I.R., 205 F.3d 897,
904 (6th Cir. 2000) abrogation recognized on other grounds by Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. C.I.R., 347 F.3d 173, 180
(6th Cir. 2003) (“Rent is defined as ‘[c]onsideration paid . . . for the use or occupancy of property . . . .’” (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 1299 (7th Ed. 1999))); Aujero v. CDA Todco, Inc., 756 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985)
(citing Black’s Law Dictionary (1979) in defining rent as “consideration paid for use or occupation of property”).
These later definitions helpfully demonstrate that courts have not recognized any material change in the definition of
rent up to the present day.
No. 14-3978                                      Velez, et al. v CMHA                          Page 11

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