Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)

Citation: Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)
Parent Document: Waleska Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Authority, 795 F.3d 578 (2015)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2015-07-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2821966/waleska-velez-v-cuyahoga-metro-... ↗

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The Act does provide that “the terms ‘rent’ or ‘rental’ mean, with respect to members of a cooperative, the
charges under the occupancy agreements between such members and the cooperative.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f).
Although this definition of rent is limited to “members of a cooperative,” it supports the view that Congress intends
that rent means the charges under occupancy agreements.
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HUD, as the regulatory authority delegated the power of administering the Act, may define in its regulations
what rent means in the Housing Act of 1937. This definition would, of course, be subject to review. The Supreme
Court has determined, however, that HUD is entitled to deference in its interpretation of the Act. Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430 (1987). HUD has yet to define rent.
Before its repeal in March 2000, HUD regulations provided an admission preference (into a Section 8 program)
for families with rent burdens—i.e., applicants who pay more than 50% of their family income in rent. Those
regulations defined “rent” to mean the “actual monthly amount due under a lease or occupancy agreement between a
family and the family’s current landlord; and for utilities purchased directly by tenants from utility providers[.]”
24 C.F.R. § 5.430 (1999), repealed by 65 Fed. Reg. 16,692, 16,716 (Mar. 29, 2000).
No. 14-3978 Velez, et al. v CMHA Page 8

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